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ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS FOR GOVERNMENT
INTERVENTION IN CLIMATE CRISIS MARKETS:
PRICE GOUGING AND THE PANDEMIC EGG
MARKET CASE STUDY
S. BYRON FRAZELLE*

The cost of a thing is the amount of what I will call life
which is required to be exchanged for it, immediately or in
the long run.1
The incredible, edible egg.2
INTRODUCTION
Fires in California,3 hurricanes along the Gulf,4 a worldwide
pandemic—it is evident that the year 2020 was defined by great crises,
most of which were direct results of or exacerbated by climate change.5
*
JD Candidate, William & Mary Law School, 2022; BA Dramatic Art, BA Political Science,
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2016. Professor Eric Kades provided invaluable
comments and support during several stages of the writing process. Thanks to Michael
Umberger for research support, Professor Stacy Kern-Scheerer for an early discussion
on the topic, and the ELPR cite checkers for their work on preparing this Note for publication. This Note was written in the middle of the pandemic and during my second year of
law school, the loneliest and hardest time of my life, and I would like to also thank my therapist, my friends, and my family—without their support this would not have been possible.
1
HENRY DAVID THOREAU, WALDEN 31 (T. Y. Crowell ed., 1899) (1854).
2
The Incredible Edible Egg, Marketing Slogan, AMERICAN EGG BOARD (1978), https://www
.youtube.com/watch?v=wfU2n17O1jE?t=27 [https://perma.cc/B8VM-EUQE].
3
Dani Anguiano, California’s Wildfire Hell: How 2020 Became the State’s Worst Ever Fire
Season, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 30, 2020, 4:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news
/2020/dec/30/california-wildfires-north-complex-record [https://perma.cc/9RV6-P8R5].
4
NOAA, Record-Breaking Atlantic Hurricane Season Draws to an End (June 10, 2021),
https://www.noaa.gov/media-release/record-breaking-atlantic-hurricane-season-draws-to
-end [https://perma.cc/BPU8-JZNH].
5
Coronavirus, Climate Change, and the Environment: A Conversation on COVID-19 with
Dr. Aaron Bernstein, Director of Harvard Chan C-CHANGE, CTR. FOR CLIMATE HEALTH,
& THE GLOB. ENV’T, HARVARD T. H. CHAN SCHOOL OF PUB. HEALTH, https://www.hsph
.harvard.edu/c-change/subtopics/coronavirus-and-climate-change/#:~:text=Many [https://
perma.cc/ANV7-C3JS] (last visited Nov. 3, 2021); Jeff Berardelli, How Climate Change
Is Making Hurricanes More Dangerous, YALE CLIMATE CONNECTIONS (July 8, 2019),
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The effects of these crises on broader American society, in particular that
of the COVID-19 pandemic, are just beginning to be realized.6 Nearly
every aspect of American life has been impacted by the pandemic and by
the corresponding responses of state and federal governments.7
Rapid price increases are a common thread linking environmental
catastrophes of various causes.8 Environmental catastrophes, like hurricanes, droughts, and pandemics, all can create scarcity, causing prices to
rise.9 Depending on the magnitude, these price increases may be characterized as “price gouging.”10 Price gouging as a practice, and crisis price
increases more broadly, can take many forms, have varying causes, and
are not infrequently the subject of litigation and academic controversy.11
The 2020 pandemic-induced price increases were unique in their
sheer breadth: commodities from thermometers to toilet paper experienced nationwide price shocks,12 due to increased demand,13 challenges

https://yaleclimateconnections.org/2019/07/how-climate-change-is-making-hurricanes
-more-dangerous/ [https://perma.cc/FVQ2-WZXD]; Ellen Gray, Satellite Data Record Shows
Climate Change’s Impact on Fires, NASA’S EARTH SCI. NEWS TEAM (Sept. 10, 2019), https://
climate.nasa.gov/news/2912/satellite-data-record-shows-climate-changes-impact-on-fires
/#:~:text=Hot%20and%20dry.,speed%20at%20which%20it%20spreads [https://perma.cc
/VT52-BEL7].
6
See Maria Nicola et al., The Socio-Economic Implications of the Coronavirus Pandemic
(COVID-19): A Review, 78 INT’L J. SURGERY 185, 185 (2020); Impact of COVID-19 on People’s
Livelihoods, Their Health and Our Food System, Joint Statement by ILO, FAO, IFAD and
WHO, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Oct. 13, 2020) [hereinafter WORLD HEALTH ORG], https://
www.who.int/news/item/13-10-2020-impact-of-covid-19-on-people’s-livelihoods-their-health
-and-our-food-systems [https://perma.cc/2EUV-75FN].
7
WORLD HEALTH ORG., supra note 6; see Paul Blake & Divyanshi Wadhwa, 2020 Year in
Review: The Impact of COVID-19 in 12 Charts, WORLD BANK BLOGS (Dec. 14, 2020), https://
blogs.worldbank.org/voices/2020-year-review-impact-covid-19-12-charts [https://perma
.cc/4GTU-Z4KL].
8
Jarrett Greenstein, The Perfect Storm: Price Gouging and Disaster, THE CURRENT (Dec. 22,
2020), https://thecurrentmsu.com/2020/12/22/the-perfect-storm-price-gouging-and-disas
ter/ [https://perma.cc/DYG9-M2SX].
9
See David Rothkopf & Claire Casey, Impacts of Climate Change, Resource Scarcity and
Foreign Policy, WORLD WILDLIFE MAG. (2014), https://www.worldwildlife.org/magazine
/issues/winter-2014/articles/impacts-of-climate-change-resource-scarcity-and-foreign
-policy [https://perma.cc/2LGF-63FM].
10
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 501.160 (2020).
11
Greenstein, supra note 8.
12
See, e.g., Reese Dunklin & Justin Pritchard, $10 Toilet Paper? Coronavirus Gouging
Complaints Surge in US, PBA (Mar. 19, 2020, 1:22 PM), https://www.pbs.org/newshour
/economy/10-toilet-paper-coronavirus-gouging-complaints-surge-in-u-s [https://perma.cc
/K22Q-39XB].
13
See, e.g., id.
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to supply chains,14 or both.15 The strain that the pandemic placed on the
food supply was particularly unprecedented.16 Animal protein markets
experienced never-before-seen challenges to their supply chains, while
simultaneously dealing with skyrocketing demand.17 Of these commodities, the egg market experienced the most dramatic shift in price, with
a consumer price index increase of 16.1% in April.18 The next highest increase was 4.3%, for the commodity category of meat, poultry, and fish.19
These commodity prices eventually leveled out, and by July even
egg prices had returned to relative stability.20 Even so, four state attorneys
general brought actions against egg suppliers for price gouging through the
spring and summer of 2020.21 In addition, calls for federal price gouging legislation have been renewed along bipartisan lines, despite overwhelming

14

See, e.g., Sara Silver, From the Filings: Supply Chain Lessons from the Pandemic, J.
ACCOUNTANCY (Feb. 18, 2021), https://www.journalofaccountancy.com/news/2021/feb/sup
ply-chain-lessons-from-coronavirus-pandemic.html [https://perma.cc/TZH4-TDJN].
15
See, e.g., Emily Feng & Amy Cheng, COVID-19 Has Caused a Shortage of Face Masks.
But They’re Surprisingly Hard to Make, NPR (Mar. 16, 2020, 2:23 PM), https://www.npr
.org/sections/goatsandsoda/2020/03/16/814929294/covid-19-has-caused-a-shortage-of-face
-masks-but-theyre-surprisingly-hard-to-mak [https://perma.cc/GWR5-TD3W].
16
Robert Johansson, Another Look at Availability and Prices of Food Amid the COVID-19
Pandemic, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. (July 29, 2021), https://www.usda.gov/media/blog/2020
/05/28/another-look-availability-and-prices-food-amid-covid-19-pandemic [https://perma.cc
/3R23-U39A].
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
Minnesota v. Forsman Farms, Inc., No. 62-CV-20-2829, at 1–2 (Minn. Dist. Ct. June 5,
2020), available at https://pa.courts.state.mn.us/CaseDetail.aspx?CaseID=1628048049
[https://perma.cc/43M6-79GH]; People v. Hillandale Farms, Corp. et al., No. 451650/2020,
BLOOMBERG (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 10, 2021); Texas v. Cal-Maine Foods, Inc., No. 2020254
27-7, BLOOMBERG (Tex. Dist. Ct. Feb. 2, 2021); West Virginia v. Dutt & Wagner, Inc., No.
20-C-68 (W. Va. Dist. Ct. July 14, 2020). The Minnesota court website does not have the
documents readily accessible, however, the assurance of discontinuance in the Minnesota
case is available online. Assurance of Discontinuance, In the Matter of Forsman Farms,
Inc., Case No. 62-CV-20-2829 (Minn. Dist. Ct. June 5, 2020), https://chamberlitigation.org
/sites/default/files/ForsmanFarms_AssuranceOfDiscontinuance%5B1%5D.pdf [https://
perma.cc/E8Y6-GA8C]. West Virginia also does not provide dockets online, however, a
copy of the West Virginia petition is available in the docket for the New York case. Exhibit
23, People v. Hillandale Farms, Corp. et al., No. 451650/2020, BLOOMBERG (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Aug. 11, 2020). As of November 2020, discovery in the West Virginia case is ongoing. Patrick
Morrisey, Report to the Governor, Senate President and House of Delegates Speaker, OFF.
ATT’Y GEN. 33 (Nov. 1, 2020), https://ago.wv.gov/publicresources/Documents/2020GR.PDF
[https://perma.cc/V5ZQ-D7HX].
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distaste among neoclassical economists for the kind of price ceilings
these laws create.22
Traditional economic critiques, however, have largely ignored the
broader ethical, political, and moral concerns of politicians and voters
that keep restrictions on price gouging popular.23 These concerns ensure
that anti-price gouging laws are an indefinite fixture in American law.24
Litigation under anti-price gouging laws, however, is not the only option
that federal and state governments have to prevent or mitigate crisis
price increases.25
This Note uses the egg market as a case study to present four
policy alternatives that state and federal governments may consider in
addressing crisis price increases, rather than resorting to anti-price gouging
litigation. Part I narrows the scope of discussion and defines price gouging,
a term that can be emotionally charged.26 Part II tells the story of the 2020
egg market, which is both an intrinsically valuable case study and a useful
model to frame policy alternatives.27 Part III examines the theoretical
underpinnings of price gouging to develop a dichotomous framework with
which to evaluate policy alternatives.28 Part IV presents and analyzes the
four policy alternatives using this framework.29 The goal of this Note is
to describe and analyze alternatives to litigation that will better resolve
the concerns that anti-price gouging laws attempt to address.
I.

PRICE GOUGING DEFINITION AND SCOPE

“Price gouging” has the potential to be a loaded term, with an
amorphous definition.30 In a sterile way, price gouging may be defined as
22
See Price Gouging Prevention Act, S. 3853, 113th Cong. (2020) (introduced by Democratic
Senator Elizabeth Warren); Ending Price-Gouging During Emergencies Act, S. 3574,
113th Cong. (2020) (introduced by Republican Senator Thom Tillis). The neoclassical
economic critique of anti-price gouging laws is described infra Part III.
23
See, e.g., Adrienne Hill, Economists Don’t Think Price Gouging Is a Problem. But What
About Our Social Values?, MARKETPLACE (Sept. 1, 2017), https://www.marketplace.org/2017
/09/01/why-economists-don’t-think-price-gouging-problem/ [https://perma.cc/4S5V-BWMM].
24
See id.; see also Heather Morton, Price Gouging State Statutes, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF
STATE LEGISLATURES (May 17, 2021), https://www.ncsl.org/research/financial-services
-and-commerce/price-gouging-state-statutes.aspx#:~:text=Thirty%2Dsix%20states%2C%
20Guam%2C,or%20deceptive%20trade%20practices%20law [https://perma.cc/JA9T-8GDT].
25
See infra Part IV.
26
See infra Part I.
27
See infra Part II.
28
See infra Part III.
29
See infra Part IV.
30
See Matt Zwolinski, The Ethics of Price Gouging, 18 BUS. ETHICS Q. 347, 349 (2008).
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the practice of raising prices of necessary commodities during crisis
scenarios in a way that is not commensurate with an increase in cost.31
While there is currently no federal anti-price gouging law, the
federal government has used price controls before to prevent hoarding of
consumer goods during certain crises.32 One such law is the Defense Production Act (“DPA”), passed in 1950 in response to the Korean War.33 At
least one price gouging lawsuit during the pandemic arose out of the
price control provisions in the DPA.34
The Georgia lawsuit notwithstanding, most price gouging litigation takes place under state statutes.35 A majority of states have laws or
regulations banning price gouging, though the scope of commodity
categories covered varies.36 Massachusetts, for example, only bans price
gouging in the context of petroleum products, and does so through regulation.37 A more typical statute bans price gouging for a wide array of
products that are “necessary” during an emergency, including food, lumber,
ice, and petroleum.38
Legal standards also vary as to the amount at which a price
increase becomes illegal.39 Many states impose a “hard quantitative
threshold” that has to be reached in order to create seller liability.40 For
example, during a declared emergency in California, sellers may not be
able to raise prices higher than ten percent of the precrisis level.41 Other
states impose a more flexible standard, banning price increases that are
“unconscionable.”42

31

Id. at 347, 349.
See, e.g., Defense Production Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 4512–4513.
33
Defense Production Act, 50 U.S.C. § 4512; The Defense Production Act of 1950: History,
Authorities, and Considerations for Congress, CONG. RSCH. SERV. (Mar. 2, 2020).
34
See Judgment, U.S. v. Ayimadu, No. 1:20-CR-275-JSA, BLOOMBERG (N.D. Ga. Sept. 3,
2020).
35
See, e.g., Fraser et al. v. Cal-Maine, No. 3:20-cv-02733, BLOOMBERG (N.D. Cal. Sept. 20,
2020); cases cited supra note 21.
36
For a comprehensive list of anti-price gouging statutes by state, see Morton, supra note 24.
37
940 MASS. CODE REGS. § 3.18 (2020).
38
See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 501.160 (2020).
39
See Morton, supra note 24.
40
Christopher Buccafusco, Daniel Hemel & Eric Talley, Price Gouging in a Pandemic, U.
CHI. COASE-SANDOR INST. L. & ECON. RSCH. PAPER NO. 921, CARDOZO LEGAL STUD. RSCH.
PAPER NO. 626, 1, 14 (2021).
41
Id.; CAL. PENAL CODE § 396 (2020).
42
Buccafusco, Hemel & Talley, supra note 40, at 14; see, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 445.903 (2021).
32
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Food commodities are typically reached by anti-price gouging laws
either explicitly, by statutory prohibitions on price gouging as applied
directly to food, or generally by statutory prohibitions on price gouging for
broadly termed “necess[ities].”43 Litigation over price gouging in the pandemic egg market, at the time of writing, took place in Texas, Minnesota,
New York, and West Virginia.44 Minnesota, New York, and Texas all apply flexible “unconscionable” standards, while West Virginia applies a cap
of ten percent.45 Texas bans price gouging of “fuel, food, medicine, lodging, building materials, construction tools, or [other] necessit[ies]” during
an emergency.46 The Minnesota Executive Order applies to “essential
consumer goods.”47 West Virginia lists many different types of goods,
“food items” and “essential consumer goods” among them.48 New York
applies anti-price gouging laws to “goods and services vital and necessary
for health.”49
It is easy to overstate these differences. Each prohibition has the
same intended effect, which is the creation of a price control during crisis
scenarios.50 The theoretical implications of these price controls will be
discussed in Part III.51 Here, the definition and effect serve as background for addressing the specific context to which these definitions are
applied—the United States egg market.

43

Compare, e.g., TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(b)(27) (2021) with N.Y. GEN. BUS.
LAW § 396-r (2020).
44
See generally Minnesota v. Forsman Farms, Inc., No. 62-CV-20-2829 (Minn. Dist. Ct.
June 5, 2020), available at https://pa.courts.state.mn.us/CaseDetail.aspx?CaseID=16280
48049 [https://perma.cc/U6QS-RZAY]; People v. Hillandale Farms, Corp. et al., No. 4516
50/2020, BLOOMBERG (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 10, 2021); Texas v. Cal-Maine Foods, Inc., No.
202025427-7, BLOOMBERG (Tex. Dist. Ct. Feb. 2, 2021); West Virginia v. Dutt & Wagner,
Inc., No. 20-C-68 (W. Va. Dist. Ct. July 14, 2020).
45
Minn. Exec. Order No. 20-10 (Mar. 20, 2020); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 396-r (2020); TEX.
BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.44 (2021) (noting the subchapter is to be applied to protect
consumers from “unconscionable actions”); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(b)(27)
(2021) (banning price gouging using the still-flexible language of “excessive or exorbitant”);
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-6J-1 (2020).
46
TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(b)(27) (2021).
47
Minn. Exec. Order No. 20-10 (Mar. 20, 2020).
48
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-6J-1 (2020).
49
N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 396-r (2020).
50
See W. David Montgomery, Robert A. Baron & Mary K. Weisskopf, Potential Effects of
Proposed Price Gouging Legislation on the Cost and Severity of Gasoline Supply Interruptions, 3 J. COMP. L. & ECON. 357, 374 (2007).
51
See infra Part III.
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Policy alternatives to anti-price gouging laws will necessarily be
context specific, even as the underlying mechanisms of supply and demand, the effect of price controls, and associated economic theories are
broadly applicable.52 Supply chains are not the same across commodity
categories or even necessarily across types of crises; neither is demand
for a given commodity.53 The policy alternatives described in Part IV will
be useful guides for government action in supply chains and consumer
markets across commodity categories, even if tailoring is required to fit
the nuances of the specific crisis, commodity market, or supply chain.54
There are several reasons why the egg market is a particularly
useful case study to examine pandemic price gouging. The first is the
availability of information on both supply and demand for eggs in the
United States, as well as the availability of historic price and pandemic
price information.55 Additionally, multiple state and federal regulatory
controls are in place for the egg market, which leaves open multilevel
policy alternatives.56 These alternatives will be readily applicable to
52

The same underlying mechanisms of supply and demand apply across different commodity categories. See ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, SUPPLY AND DEMAND (Encyclopedia
Britannica eds. 2019), https://www.britannica.com/summary/supply-and-demand [https://
perma.cc/982Q-56FK].
53
This is true even among food commodities, which faced different kinds of supply
challenges during the pandemic. See Hallie Casey, COVID-19 and the US Food Supply
Chain: What Happened?, SUSTAINABLE FOOD CTR. (Aug. 12, 2020), https://sustainablefood
center.org/latest/blog/covid-19-and-the-us-food-supply-chain-what-happened [https://
perma.cc/3Q2D-Y5NA]. Different supply and demand considerations exist for goods like
medicines, for example, in different kinds of disasters. See Michael A. Jhung et al., Chronic
Diseases and Disasters: Medication Demands of Hurricane Katrina Evacuees, 33-3 AM.
J. PREVENTATIVE MED. 207, 209 (2007).
54
See infra Part IV.
55
See Mario Ibarburu, U.S. Egg Cost of Production and Prices, EGG INDUS. CTR. 3–4
(May 6, 2020); Mario Ibarburu, Richard Gates & Lesa Vold, EIC preliminary estimation
of the impact of COVID-19 on egg prices and producers’ revenue, EGG INDUS. CTR. 3–5
(May 6, 2020).
56
Generally, the USDA and FDA share regulatory oversight over eggs. Gretchen Goetz,
Who Inspects What? A Food Safety Scramble, FOOD SAFETY NEWS (Dec. 16, 2010), https://
www.foodsafetynews.com/2010/12/who-inspects-what-a-food-safety-scramble/ [https://
perma.cc/WP5T-3BBR]. However, states can exert their own regulatory oversight over
the industry. Massachusetts, for example, passed animal protection legislation that may
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other food commodity markets, which have similarly multifaceted regulatory structures.57
It is also intrinsically valuable to evaluate the availability of food
during a crisis, particularly in light of rising food insecurity in the United
States during the pandemic.58 Eggs are a low-cost protein, both an
important part of a healthy diet and a product that is generally accessible across income groups because of their typically low price.59 Eggs are
also an important protein alternative to meat.60 In sum, eggs are just the
type of necessity that many anti-price gouging laws seek to protect.61 In
looking forward to future crises, questions surrounding the protection of
the food supply and availability of products like eggs will be paramount to
ensure health and safety for Americans in short- and long-term crises.62
B.

Demand Shock

Though there is some evidence that COVID-19 had reached the
United States as early as December 2019,63 awareness of the situation
affect egg supplies independent of the pandemic. Jon Chesto, Egg Industry Warns of
Shortage in Mass. Without Legislative Action, THE BOSTON GLOBE (Mar. 6, 2021, 12:17
AM), https://www.bostonglobe.com/2021/03/06/business/egg-industry-warns-shortage -mass
-without-legislative-action/ [https://perma.cc/24PB-W7CJ]. See also Egg Laws by State, NAT’L
EGG REGUL. OFF.’S, http://nerous.org/state-laws-regulations/egg-laws-by-state/ [https://
perma.cc/LR4R-DB7U].
57
See Goetz, supra note 56 (documenting federal food inspection authorities across
different food commodities).
58
Bridget Balch, 54 Million People in America Face Food Insecurity During the Pandemic.
It Could Have Dire Consequences for Their Health, ASS’N OF AM. MED. COLLS. (Oct. 15, 2020),
https://www.aamc.org/news-insights/54-million-people-america-face-food-insecurity-dur
ing-pandemic-it-could-have-dire-consequences-their [https://perma.cc/R6HM-4JGC]. See
also The Impact of the Coronavirus on Food Insecurity in 2020 & 2021, FEEDING AMERICA
(2021), https://www.feedingamerica.org/sites/default/files/2021-03/National%20Projec
tions%20Brief_3.9.2021_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/576M-7RJF].
59
See Stacey Vanek Smith & Cardiff Garcia, Egg Prices: States Cry Foul, NPR: THE INDICATOR FROM PLANET MONEY (Aug. 24, 2020, 5:16 PM), https://www.npr.org/2020/08/24
/905566618/egg-prices-states-cry-foul [https://perma.cc/5B2N-534H].
60
Ellie Krieger, Cutting Down on Meat? Be Careful What You Replace It with, WASH.
POST (May 26, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/wellness/cutting-down
-on-meat-be-careful-what-you-replace-it-with/2015/05/26/94e77a0e-03b1-11e5-a428-c98
4eb077d4e_story.html [https://perma.cc/F2CB-FNNA].
61
See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 396-r (2020); Petition at 1–2, People v. Hillandale Farms,
Corp. et al., No. 451650/2020, BLOOMBERG (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 10, 2021).
62
See Chris J. Macias, Is the Food Supply Strong Enough to Weather the COVID-19
Pandemic, UC DAVIS (June 25, 2020), https://www.ucdavis.edu/food/news/is-food-supply
-strong-enough-to-weather-covid-19-pandemic/ [https://perma.cc/26GT-LU8W].
63
Joann G. Elmore et al., Excess Patient Visits for Cough and Pulmonary Disease at a
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and lockdown measures did not begin until March 2020.64 At this point,
demand for essential food items started to rapidly increase.65 Almost all
food commodity categories experienced price increases, with the egg market
experiencing the highest change in the retail price index.66 Consumer
panic-buying, coupled with decreased restaurant traffic, led to large increases in demand across food product categories.67
At its peak, the warehouse prices of Midwest large white eggs
eclipsed recent historic levels, nearing 270 cents per dozen.68 The Urner
Barry benchmark for a dozen conventional eggs in California increased
from $1.55 to $3.66 by late March.69 Wholesale customers in New York
reported paying four to five times their normal price per carton.70 By late
April, however, as demand cooled, prices returned to approximately precrisis levels.71 In contrast, the liquid egg market, which consists of eggs
liquified and used primarily by the restaurant industry, experienced an
all-time low in prices.72 The price for liquid egg bottomed out at almost
half of the previous historic low.73

Large US Health System in the Months Prior to the COVID-19 Pandemic: Time-Series
Analysis, 22 J. MED. INTERNET RSCH. 1, 8 (2020).
64
AJMC Staff, A Timeline of COVID-19 Developments in 2020, AM. J. MANAGED CARE
(Jan. 1, 2021), https://www.ajmc.com/view/a-timeline-of-covid19-developments-in-2020
[https://perma.cc/YB4Z-4XS5].
65
Robert Johansson, Will COVID-19 Threaten Availability and Affordability of Our Food?,
U.S. DEPT. OF AGRIC. (July 29, 2021), https://www.usda.gov/media/blog/2020/04/16/will-co
vid-19-threaten-availability-and-affordability-our-food [https://perma.cc/526M-CRBM].
66
Johansson, supra note 16.
67
Id.
68
Egg Markets Overview, U.S. DEPT. OF AGRIC. (Sept. 24, 2021), https://www.ams.usda.gov
/sites/default/files/media/Egg%20Markets%20Overview.pdf [https://perma.cc/GP4L-5KFG].
69
Samantha Masunaga, Why Are Eggs So Expensive? Blame Coronavirus Demand, L.A.
TIMES (Apr. 8, 2020, 4:43 PM), https://www.latimes.com/business/story/2020-04-08/egg
-prices-rising-coronavirus [https://perma.cc/FQV3-SQR9].
70
Press Release, Off. N.Y. Att’y Gen., Attorney General James Sues One of the Nation’s
Largest Egg Producers for Price Gouging During the Coronavirus Pandemic (Aug. 11,
2020) [hereinafter Off. N.Y. Att’y Gen.], https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/2020/attorney-gen
eral-james-sues-one-nations-largest-egg-producers-price-gouging [https://perma.cc/V2KT
-NSAY]. This translated to retail prices as well; a retail customer in New York reported
paying $5.49 for a dozen eggs at his usual store. Id.
71
Ibarburu, Gates & Vold, supra note 55, at 3 (“As the demand moderated, prices went
down at almost the same rate that they rose. During the last week of April, [shell eggs]
reached a price level similar to the one before the crisis.”).
72
Id. at 4.
73
The historic low was 14.4 cents per pound in 2017, while prices reached 8 cents per
pound in April 2020. Id.
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The markets for both liquid egg and shell eggs reflect the larger
trends in the United States during the first months of the COVID-19
pandemic.74 Decreased restaurant traffic led directly to a large decrease
in the amount of liquid egg demanded by the restaurant industry.75
Meanwhile, the shutdown also meant more people would be cooking at
home, leading to increased demand for shell eggs.76
The egg market price increases largely seem driven by demand, but
this is not immediately evident. Supply chain disruptions were not unheard of, particularly in other animal protein markets due to outbreaks
of COVID-19 in processing plants.77 These were prevalent particularly in
labor-intensive industries that relied on farm workers.78 Outbreaks of
COVID-19 in processing plants disrupted supply while consumer demand
was independently rising as well.79
It does not seem, however, that the egg industry experienced a
similar shock to its supply chains.80 In contrast to areas like pork production, egg processing usually occurs at the same production facility.81 Egg
handling and processing is primarily automated, at least when compared
to labor-intensive industries like pork production.82 Disruptions due to
labor shortages were not as common. Additionally, cost of production for
eggs, primarily a function of feed costs, were at or below normal levels
through April 2020.83
C.

Attempts at Directly Addressing Egg Market Price Increases

Despite the fact that the period of high prices was relatively shortlived, two noteworthy attempts at market controls specific to the egg
74

Id.
See id.
76
Id.; Vanek Smith & Garcia, supra note 59.
77
Casey, supra note 53.
78
Thomas Reardon & Johan Swinnen, COVID-19 and Resilience Innovations in Food Supply
Chains, INT’L FOOD POL’Y RSCH. INST. (July 6, 2020), https://www.ifpri.org/blog/covid-19
-and-resilience-innovations-food-supply-chains [https://perma.cc/85WZ-DKCJ] (“Pandemicrelated disruptions in supply chains are concentrated in their labor-intensive segments.”).
79
See Casey, supra note 53. Demand for all food commodities rose—particularly animal
proteins. Johansson, supra note 16.
80
Egg Processing, U.S. POULTRY & EGG ASS’N, https://ffa.app.box.com/v/uspoultryandegg
[https://perma.cc/VLS5-H4GM].
81
Id.
82
Compare id. (“Egg handling and processing is performed with automated equipment”)
with Casey, supra note 53 (“On any given day, up to a thousand employees are in one of
these [pork processing] facilities, processing meat for grocery and restaurant sales.”).
83
Ibarburu, Gates & Vold, supra note 55, at 5.
75
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market were put into place.84 These were a modification to the Egg
Safety Rule and other rules promulgated by the Food & Drug Administration (“FDA”),85 and the price gouging litigation brought by state
attorneys general.86
1.

FDA Modification to Egg Safety Rule

The dual issue of decreased demand in the market for liquid egg
and skyrocketing demand for shell eggs theoretically presented a clear
supply-side solution.87 Though the Department of Agriculture (“USDA”)
is responsible for grading eggs and most other regulatory measures for
food commodity production, the FDA is responsible for the safety and
labeling of shell eggs.88 The FDA exercises its authority through promulgating regulations, particularly 21 C.F.R. 118, also known as the Egg
Safety Rule.89
In order to address the scarcity issues caused by increased demand,
the FDA promulgated a temporary change to the Egg Safety Rule in early
April.90 This change allowed producers that sent eggs exclusively to
processing facilities for “egg products,” e.g., liquid egg, to sell their eggs
as table eggs.91 This new policy relaxed some of the safety conditions egg
producers must meet before selling their eggs as table eggs.92 Additionally, in response to decreased restaurant traffic, the FDA promulgated
a guidance allowing restaurants to resell their eggs without labels.93
Demand for table eggs, however, had leveled off by late April,
shortly after the rule took effect.94 This limited the time frame for the
84

Ron Sterk, Eggs on Rollercoaster Due to COVID-19, FOOD BUS. NEWS (Apr. 22, 2020),
https://www.foodbusinessnews.net/articles/15875-eggs-on-rollercoaster-due-to-covid-19
[https://perma.cc/DZ55-P3EW].
85
Production, Storage, and Transportation of Shell Eggs, 21 C.F.R. §§ 118.1–118.12 (2009).
86
See, e.g., People v. Hillandale Farms, Corp. et al., No. 451650/2020, BLOOMBERG (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Mar. 10, 2021).
87
See Ibarburu, Gates & Vold, supra note 55, at 2.
88
See Goetz, supra note 56.
89
Production, Storage, and Transportation of Shell Eggs, 21 C.F.R. §§ 118.1–118.12 (2021).
90
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FDA-2020-D-1139-0006, TEMPORARY POLICY REGARDING
PACKAGING AND LABELING OF SHELL EGGS SOLD BY RETAIL FOOD ESTABLISHMENTS DURING
THE COVID-19 PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCY (2020) [hereinafter TEMPORARY POLICY REGARDING PACKAGING AND LABELING], https://www.fda.gov/media/136732/download [https://
perma.cc/G8FF-YCZ9].
91
Id.
92
Id.
93
TEMPORARY POLICY REGARDING PACKAGING AND LABELING, supra note 90.
94
See Ibarburu, Gates & Vold, supra note 55, at 3.
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efficacy of the policy.95 Due to the nature of egg facilities, most liquid egg
producers could not quickly change production, and did not have the
necessary infrastructure to sell their eggs as shell eggs.96 Similarly, egg
producers that typically shipped large flats of eggs to restaurants had
issues converting their equipment to the smaller flats necessary for instore shipments.97 Some liquid egg producers also found that, even if they
could get their eggs to market, many retailers would not accept them. 98
Though the rule change may have had some marginal effect on
diverting eggs into the higher-demand channels, it was not an overwhelming success.99 This demonstrates that the egg supply chain was
inelastic in the short term.
2.

Price Gouging Litigation

Pursuant to their anti-price gouging state statutes or executive
orders, four state attorneys general brought actions against egg producers: Texas, West Virginia, Minnesota, and New York.100 At the time of
writing, only the Texas and the Minnesota actions have been fully adjudicated,101 and in opposite directions.102
a.

Texas

Recall that the Texas price gouging statute applies a flexible “exorbitant or excessive” standard to pricing of necessities broadly and to
95

See id.
Id.
97
See id.
98
Id.
99
See id.
100
See generally Minnesota v. Forsman Farms, Inc., No. 62-CV-20-2829 (Minn. Dist. Ct.
June 5, 2020), available at https://pa.courts.state.mn.us/CaseDetail.aspx?CaseID=162804
8049 [https://perma.cc/U6QS-RZAY]; People v. Hillandale Farms, Corp. et al., No. 451650
/2020, BLOOMBERG (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 10, 2021); Texas v. Cal-Maine Foods, Inc., No. 202
025427-7, BLOOMBERG (Tex. Dist. Ct. Feb. 2, 2021); West Virginia v. Dutt & Wagner, Inc.,
No. 20-C-68 (W. Va. Dist. Ct. July 14, 2020).
101
As of March 10, 2021, the New York litigation has been in adjournment since September
2020. See People v. Hillandale Farms, Corp. et al., No. 451650/2020, BLOOMBERG (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. Mar. 10, 2021). The West Virginia litigation is currently in the discovery phase. See
Morrisey, supra note 21, at 33. West Virginia also filed an additional lawsuit against a different egg distributor in August 2020, which also appears to be ongoing. See id.; Brendan
Tierney, Second Lawsuit Filed for Egg Price Gouging, WHSV (Aug. 11, 2020, 1:45 PM),
https://www.whsv.com/2020/08/11/second-lawsuit-filed-for-egg-price-gouging/ [https://
perma.cc/E4X2-72VX].
102
Minnesota v. Forsman Farms, No. 202025427-7, BLOOMBERG (Tex. Dist. Ct. Apr. 23,
2020).
96
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several specific categories of commodities, including food.103 The State of
Texas brought the action against Cal-Maine Foods, the largest egg
wholesaler in the United States, alleging price increases of up to 300%.104
Cal-Maine bases its pricing off of the spot market.105 According to Texas,
this did not constitute forces outside of Cal-Maine’s control, and CalMaine charged high prices to take advantage of the market.106 Because
of this, Cal-Maine was “on track to make windfall profits.”107
In response, Cal-Maine raised a number of defenses.108 Their motion
to dismiss was granted, and the case was dismissed with prejudice.109 The
trial court, however, gave no reasoning in its under-100-word order.110 The
state filed an appeal, but the reasons for dismissal are as of yet unclear.111
b.

Minnesota

In contrast, the Minnesota lawsuit was not against a large national company, but a relatively small regional producer.112 The Minnesota
attorney general brought the action pursuant to Emergency Executive
Order 20-10, which prohibits the sale of “essential consumer goods” for a
price that is “unconscionably excessive.”113 Forsman Farms, like Cal-Maine,
tied their prices to a third-party market index. 114 This led to a 150% increase in egg prices.115 The case settled, with interesting provisions.116
103

TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.46(b)(27).
Petition at 9–10, Texas v. Cal-Maine Foods, Inc., No. 202025427-7, BLOOMBERG (Tex.
Dist. Ct. Apr. 23, 2021).
105
Id.
106
Id. at 11–12.
107
Id.
108
See Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 3, Texas v. Cal-Maine Foods, Inc., No. 202025
427-7, BLOOMBERG (Tex. Dist. Ct. June 26, 2021).
109
Order at 1, Texas v. Cal-Maine Foods, Inc., No. 202025427-7, BLOOMBERG (Tex. Dist.
Ct. Aug. 13, 2021).
110
Id.
111
Notice of Appeal, Texas v. Cal-Maine Foods, Inc., No. 202025427-7, BLOOMBERG (Tex.
Dist. Ct. Sept. 11, 2021).
112
Forsman Farms, the defendant, only acquired around $24 million in revenue in 2019.
Forsman Farms, Inc., KONA EQUITY, https://www.konaequity.com/company/forsman-farms
-inc-4019014863/# [https://perma.cc/ZM5K-PLCD]; see FORSMAN FARMS, http://www.fors
manfarms.com/ [https://perma.cc/4GQE-R9L3].
113
Minn. Exec. Order No. 20-10 (Mar. 20, 2020).
114
Press Release, Off. Minn. Att’y Gen., Attorney General Ellison Reaches Price-Gouging
Settlement on Egg Prices (Apr. 28, 2020) [hereinafter Off. Minn. Att’y Gen.], https://www
.ag.state.mn.us/Office/Communications/2020/04/28_ForsmanFarms.asp [https://perma.cc
/2KY7-SBX5].
115
Id.
116
Id.
104
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Despite the executive order creating an “unconscionable” standard for price
gouging, the injunctive relief provides for a 20% pre-pandemic cap in egg
price increases for Forsman Farms, subject to a stayed civil penalty of
$75,000.117 This is the kind of true price ceiling price gouging statutes
seek to adopt, and is similar to percentage caps in other statutes.118
III.

PRICE GOUGING THEORY AND A FRAMEWORK FOR WEIGHING
ALTERNATIVES

Why did the events of 2020, in the egg market as well as in other
hard-hit commodity markets, spur so much action and call for anti-price
gouging measures? Many economists have long critiqued anti-price
gouging laws as “stand[ing] in the way of . . . competitive markets.”119 These
critiques, however, have been “about as popular as criticizing Jesus for
being a lousy carpenter.”120 The many jurisdictions that have passed price
gouging legislation,121 the multiple bipartisan proposals for federal antiprice gouging laws,122 and continued enforcement actions by state attorneys
general123 demonstrate that neoclassical economists are losing the price
gouging debate.
117

Assurance of Discontinuance at 7, Minnesota Attorney General’s Office v. Forsman
Farms, Inc., Case No. 62-CV-20-2829 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Apr. 27, 2020), available at https://
chamberlitigation.org/sites/default/files/ForsmanFarms_AssuranceOfDiscontinuance%5B
1%5D.pdf [https://perma.cc/R7WA-LHDR].
118
See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 396 (2021).
119
Hill, supra note 23.
120
Dwight R. Lee, The Two Moralities of Outlawing Price Gouging, CATO INST.: REGUL. 28,
29 (2014).
121
Thirty-six states, plus Guam, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and the District of
Columbia all have some form of price gouging prohibition in place, either through legislation or regulation. Morton, supra note 24. Minnesota and Maryland do not have antiprice gouging statutes but have prohibited the practice during the pandemic by executive
order. Buccafusco, Hemel & Talley, supra note 40, at 13; Minn. Exec. Order No. 20-10
(Mar. 20, 2020), at 1; Md. Exec. Order No. 20-03-23-03 (Mar. 23, 2020), at 1.
122
Price Gouging Prevention Act, S. 3853, 116th Cong. (2020); Ending Price-Gouging
During Emergencies Act, S. 3574, 116th Cong. (2020); Price Gouging Prevention Act,
H.R. 6450, 116th Cong. (2020).
123
This includes the recent enforcement actions in the egg market, supra Section II.C.2,
however, price gouging actions by state attorneys general have been brought often. See,
e.g., Samantha Oller, Retailers Face Gouging Lawsuits Post-Hurricane, CSP (Sept. 19,
2017), https://www.cspdailynews.com/fuels/retailers-face-gouging-lawsuits-post-hurricane
[https://perma.cc/2PAH-R6KH] (litigation over oil prices in the wake of Hurricane Harvey);
Paul Muschick, Phillipsburg Area Hotel Settles Price Gouging Cases, THE MORNING CALL
(Nov. 6, 2013), https://www.mcall.com/news/local/mc-xpm-2013-11-06-mc-hurricane-sandy
-price-gouging-watchdog-20131106-story.html [https://perma.cc/LC42-EWWQ] (describing
litigation over price gouging hotel rooms during Hurricane Sandy).
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It is standard practice for price gouging papers to include sections
discussing the theoretical underpinnings of price gouging, and this
Section, in part, does the same.124 However, the primary goal of this
Section is to develop a dichotomous framework with which to weigh the
distributional effects of alternative policies. As Professor Snyder notes,
alternative policy proposals must be weighed against each other in the
price gouging context.125 This framework will assist in a more robust
analysis of policy alternatives than presentation alone. The framework
analyzes price gouging alternatives through efficiency and equity, metrics
that capture two distinct critiques of anti-price gouging laws.
A.

Neoclassical Microeconomic Theory and the Efficiency Metric

Many economists’ contempt126 for anti-price gouging laws is rooted
in neoclassical microeconomic theory.127 In a disaster scenario, demand
for certain goods increases,128 typically including “essentials,” like food
necessities, and “non-essentials,” like generators and gasoline.129 When
demand increases and supply stays the same, price increases.130 Disasters may also disrupt supply chains, decreasing supply and also causing
prices to increase.131
Neoclassical economics holds that these kinds of price increases lead
to efficient allocation of resources: those that are willing to pay the higher
price will be the ones most in need of the commodity, while those without
high need will not want to pay the higher price.132 The high price also

124

See, e.g., Caitlin E. Ball, Note, Sticker Shock at the Pump: An Evaluation of the
Massachusetts Petroleum Price-Gouging Regulation, 44 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 907, 910 (2011);
Emily Bae, Note, Are Anti-Gouging Legislations Effective Against Sellers During Disasters?,
4 ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L. J. 79, 82 (2009).
125
Jeremy Snyder, What’s the Matter with Price Gouging?, 19 BUS. ETHICS Q. 275, 284
(2009).
126
Professor Munger candidly expressed bafflement at the public’s response to exorbitant
pricing of ice in the wake of a hurricane. Michael Munger, They Clapped: Can Price-Gouging
Laws Prohibit Scarcity?, THE LIBR. OF ECON. & LIBERTY (Jan. 8, 2007), https://www
.econlib.org/library/Columns/y2007/Mungergouging.html [https://perma.cc/9GYJ-NA34].
127
Buccafusco, Hemel & Talley, supra note 40, at 5.
128
Snyder, supra note 125, at 275.
129
See id. at 291 n.12.
130
This is a basic feature of supply and demand. For a graphical visualization of the demand
curve, see Bae, supra note 124, at 86 fig. 1.1; ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, supra note 52.
131
See Bae, supra note 124, at 79–80; Silver, supra note 14.
132
See Zwolinski, supra note 30, at 352 (“[W]illingness to pay the higher price is a reflection of this increased need.”).
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induces producers to produce more of the product in demand, or to move
more of their product to the market experiencing the price increase.133
A price control, like one created by anti-price gouging laws, leads
to inefficient allocation of resources.134 Price controls lead to long lines
and further exhaustion of already scarce supplies, leading to shortages.135
Sellers, faced with the cost of selling at a lower price than the market can
hold, may turn to or create a black market for the product, in order to
charge the efficient market price.136 Anti-price gouging laws are thus
disruptive of the price mechanism and antithetical to the market forces
of supply and demand, according to the neoclassical economic critique.137
To capture this critique, the first metric in the framework is
efficiency. Alternatives to price gouging may be examined as to whether
and to what extent they leave basic market forces in place to generate
efficient outcomes.138 Policies that are more efficient than anti-price
gouging laws will allow the price mechanism to function with relatively
less impediment and limit the effects to underlying supply and demand.139
The benefits of a relatively efficient policy are near-term supply increases, allocation of resources to those with greater demand for those
resources, and the prevention of black market formation.140
B.

Fairness Concerns and the Equity Metric

For many people, there is still a gut reaction against price gouging.141 A good deal of behavioral economics literature has centered around
the perceptions of fairness that underlie this “gut feeling” which,142 as a
133

See Munger, supra note 126 (“The only way to ensure low prices, and large supply, to
buyers is to allow sellers to charge high prices, the highest they can get”) (emphasis in
original). For more information on the price mechanism, see generally F. A. Hayek, The
Use of Knowledge in Society, 35-4 THE AMERICAN ECON. REV. 519 (1945).
134
See Montgomery, Baron & Weisskopf, supra note 50, at 379.
135
See id. at 380, 387.
136
See Michael Brewer, Planning Disaster: Price Gouging Statutes and the Shortages
They Create, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 1101, 1128 (2007) (“The most obvious way market actors
might avoid price controls is to create black markets in the goods they need.”).
137
See id. at 1126.
138
See id. (“[A] market with a floating price indicative of true supply and demand should
result in increased goods delivered from outside the region, as well as increased goods as
a consequence of speculative storage by local suppliers.”).
139
Id.
140
Id.; Zwolinski, supra note 30, at 352.
141
Matt Zwolinski, Dialogue on Price Gouging: Price Gouging, Non-Worseness, and Distributive Justice, 19 BUS. ETHICS Q. 295, 295 (2009).
142
Price gouging has a long history as a topic of study for behavioral economists. See, e.g.,
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popular sentiment, generates anti-price gouging laws and litigation.143
To state the matter simply, consumers do not perceive crisis price increases as “fair,” and this perception leads to anti-gouging legislation to
address the fairness concerns.144 The recent work by Buccafusco, Hemel,
and Talley suggests that these fairness concerns are context-specific and
dependent on relative price increases.145
There are, of course, several different positivist arguments for
anti-price gouging laws,146 but the messaging from attorneys general
around their price gouging litigation implies that distributional concerns
are at the heart of their argument.147 Because of this messaging, and the
general salience of distributional concerns in 2020,148 the focus here will
be on the distributional issues.
Disaster price increases, in the short term, can put certain products
out of reach of poorer communities.149 Until a new post-disaster equilibrium is reached, the high prices remain, which may be prohibitive for
individuals without significant buying power.150 The neoclassical approach assumes buying power is an adequate signal for need in a disaster scenario; this may not be true for low- or fixed-income individuals.151

Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch & Richard Thaler, Fairness as a Constraint on Profit
Seeking: Entitlements in the Market, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 728, 738–40 (1986); Christine Jolls,
Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN.
L. REV. 1471, 1512–13 (1998); Buccafusco, Hemel & Talley, supra note 40, at 63–64.
143
See Buccafusco, Hemel & Talley, supra note 40, at 10 (“[A] legislature might enact a
price gouging law simply because a critical fraction of the population shares a distaste
for the incidence of price gouging.”).
144
See id. at 3 (“Much of the concern over price gouging appears to be rooted in a perception that certain types of price hikes during an emergency are simply ‘unfair.’”).
145
Id. at 64.
146
See id. at 7–8; Snyder, supra note 125, at 279.
147
See, e.g., Off. N.Y. Att’y Gen., supra note 70 (“Hillandale made an estimated $4 million
from unlawfully increasing the price of these eggs, which were often sold in grocery stores
located in low-income communities.”); Off. Minn. Att’y Gen., supra note 114 (“It’s harder
than ever for Minnesotans to afford their lives during this pandemic.”).
148
See, e.g., Andie Corban & Kai Ryssdal, What the Current Protests Have To Do With
Economic Inequality, MARKETPLACE (June 2, 2020), https://www.marketplace.org/2020/06
/02/what-the-current-protests-have-to-do-with-economic-inequality/ [https://perma.cc
/B6WZ-XD4Y].
149
Snyder, supra note 125, at 281.
150
See id.
151
See John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan S. Masur, Well-Being Analysis
vs. Cost-Benefit Analysis, 62 DUKE L. J. 1603, 1652–53 (2013); Buccafusco, Hemel & Talley,
supra note 40, at 7 (“[P]eople who are poor and/or facing liquidity constraints may simply
be unable to pay their true hedonic valuations.”).
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In this way, the short-term rationing scheme of price increases favors the
wealthy over the poor.152
As Buccafusco, Hemel, and Talley note, however, the distributional
argument in favor of price gouging laws is “largely a negative argument
against markets, rather than a positive argument for any particular
alternatives.”153 In addition, price controls have their own distributional
shortcomings.154 Price controls, of the kind that anti-gouging prohibitions
create, lead to allocation based on a first come, first served basis, which
is, at best, an imperfect solution.155 Even when framed as equitable, price
controls and anti-price gouging laws do not ensure equal distribution but
only equal opportunity to access the commodity.156 The long lines predicted by the neoclassical model create their own barrier to equitable
distribution, which may be particularly pronounced for older or disabled
consumers who cannot wait in long lines, or low-wage workers who cannot take time to do so.157
To account for the distributional concerns present in both pricecontrolled markets and free markets, the second metric in the framework
is equity. Do the policy alternatives address distribution in low-income
communities? In this context, a product being cost-prohibitive may not
necessarily be completely “unaffordable” in the common understanding
of the word, but it would suffice to be prohibitive if it contributes to changes
in buying decisions of low-income individuals.158 By addressing distributional concerns, a more equitable policy would also likely correlate with
increased popularity among the public.159

152

Snyder, supra note 125, at 282.
Buccafusco, Hemel & Talley, supra note 40, at 8.
154
See Snyder, supra note 125, at 284.
155
Id.
156
Zwolinski, supra note 141, at 298.
157
See Snyder, supra note 125, at 284; Buccafusco, Hemel & Talley, supra note 40, at 8.
158
See Elaine Waxman, The Costs and Impacts of Rising Food Prices Among Low-Income
Households, 8 J. FOOD L. & POL’Y 213, 214 (“An examination of families’ desperate
struggle to afford basic needs and to weather shifts in their purchasing power suggests
that both the public and policymakers have hastily overlooked the impact food prices
have on low-income families.”); see also id. at 215 (“As families struggle to make ends
meet, there may be a significant incentive to substitute cheaper, energy-dense calories
in lieu of more expensive, nutrient-rich foods, which represents another ‘hidden’ cost of
food acquisition for low-income households.”).
159
Press releases from popularly elected officials highlighting the distributional effects
of price gouging, and their attempts to resolve them, seem to suggest this would be the
case. See, e.g., Off. N.Y. Att’y Gen., supra note 70.
153
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POLICY ALTERNATIVES TO ANTI-PRICE GOUGING LAWS

Even though “[a]ll our distributive options are imperfect,”160 weighing distributive policies against each other will assist federal and state
policy makers in deciding how to address crisis price increases in the most
effective ways. Using the framework developed above, four policy options
are analyzed here with the goal of correcting efficiency and distributive
shortcomings of anti-price gouging laws. These are: (A) a policy not to
litigate; (B) supply-side regulatory changes; (C) quantity limits (binding
rationing); and (D) food subsidies (non-binding rationing).161 The analyses
below are by no means exhaustive reviews of the implications of these
policies, but serve merely to introduce them as alternatives to price
gouging litigation and briefly describe how they may advance efficiency
and equity goals using the framework developed above.162
A.

Policy Not to Litigate

A policy not to litigate price gouging claims leaves the price mechanism wholly in place.163 This is the preferred policy of neoclassical
economists arguing for efficient allocation.164 While the basic implications
of this policy are discussed above,165 it is important to highlight the effects
in light of the efficiency-equity framework.
Whether consciously or not, most states chose this policy by not
litigating claims against egg producers.166 California, for example, brought
price gouging claims against producers of masks, but not egg producers.167
160

Zwolinski, supra note 30, at 362.
This is a non-exhaustive list. Notable omissions are auctioning, Buccafusco, Hemel &
Talley, supra note 40, at 20, and income subsidies. Auctioning is seller-specific, not generally a government policy. See id. Income subsidies are an interesting policy alternative,
but as this Note focuses on one commodity market, income subsidies, which are generally
not specific to single commodity markets, have been omitted. See Brewer, supra note 136,
at 1132–33 (describing food voucher programs as a potential intervention during crisis
price increases).
162
Supra Part III.
163
See Brewer, supra note 136, at 1102.
164
See id.; Montgomery, Baron & Weisskopf, supra note 50, at 376.
165
Supra Section III.A.
166
The four states described in Part II are the only states to bring egg market price
gouging litigation. See supra Section II.C.2.
167
See Press Release, Off. Att’y Gen. Cal., Attorney General Becerra: Charges Filed Against
Los Angeles County Pharmacist for Price Gouging on Masks (June 18, 2020) [hereinafter
Off. Att’y Gen. Cal.], https://oag.ca.gov/news/press-releases/attorney-general-becerra-charges
-filed-against-los-angeles-county-pharmacist [https://perma.cc/YQ4Z-REE6].
161
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This is not for lack of evidence—a private price gouging action was
brought for high egg prices in California during the pandemic.168
Allowing egg prices to rise without any intervention likely reflected
the demand surges of early Spring.169 True demand for food commodities,
including eggs, rose with the increased need to cook at home.170 Further,
the producers in the egg market litigation did not necessarily make the
choice to increase prices, as contract prices were all tied to a third-party
market index.171 While price gouging can be a conscious choice to inflate
prices, and is often described as such, that does not appear to be what happened in the egg market.172 Even if the price index is a “feedback loop”
between large producers and the market,173 smaller producers likely do
not exert control over this process.174 Applying the concept more broadly,
it is irrelevant if price increases are deliberate, as price gouging liability
is generated whether or not it was a conscious choice.175 If price did truly
reflect demand in the pandemic egg market, then the price increases
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v. Cal-Maine Foods, Inc., Docket No. 202025427-7, BLOOMBERG (Tex. Dist. Ct. Feb. 2, 2021);
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should have led to efficient allocation: those who truly demanded eggs
would buy them at the higher price; black markets would not arise.176
However, with rising unemployment and food insecurity during
177
2020, consumer demand may not have fully captured those for whom
the ability to pay constrained their purchasing choices.178 There is also
evidence of hoarding behavior by consumers, also not reflective of consumers’ true demand.179 Finally, the egg supply was inelastic in the short term.
Egg producers could not immediately make more eggs to meet demand,
so the price-induced, near-term supply increases were generally not seen.180
These factors demonstrate that the pricing mechanism, acting by itself,
may not meet distributive or equitable goals.
B.

Supply-Side Regulatory Changes

The supply-side changes the FDA pursued in April 2020, may be
the intervention that best balances efficiency and equity.181 Changes to
the egg safety rule, as well as permitting restaurants to sell surplus eggs,
were policies designed to meet the increased demand in the shell egg
market.182 One could also imagine similar changes to state regulatory
structures, though none appeared to take effect in 2020.183 No price
controls are involved in these policies, and the price mechanism is thus
able to move and be responsive to market forces.184 This is characteristic
of a highly efficient policy.185
Simultaneously, supply-side changes were government intervention designed to decrease egg prices and meet the demand for eggs across
176
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income groups.186 This would have the benefit of addressing distributional concerns by lowering prices in the near-term and increasing the
availability of eggs.187 This is beneficial for governments that want to be
perceived as addressing constituent concerns to high prices.188
The change to the egg safety rule, however, was perceived as a
failure.189 Producers could not easily pivot production; when they did,
their eggs were sometimes not accepted.190 Relaxing safety measures has
its own costs, and retailers may not accept the products for either real or
perceived quality concerns.191 The egg supply chain was also relatively
resilient, especially compared with labor-intensive industries, and as the
initial shock of the pandemic wore off, panic buying, as well as overall
demand, fell to normal levels.192 The short-term inelasticity of the egg
market meant that supply was not increased in time, prices remained
high for the intervening period, and the equity concerns were not addressed until the market adjusted.193
C.

Quantity Limits and Binding Rationing

Quantity limits place a constraining limit on consumer demand.194
Rather than buy two, five, or ten cartons of eggs, consumers are constrained by an external force setting a limit on consumption, say, to one
carton of eggs.195 This may also be referred to as “binding rationing.”196
Many governments throughout history have utilized quantity limits during
crises, particularly during times of war.197
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Private retailers began placing quantity limits without government
direction early on in the pandemic.198 As early as the first weeks of March
2020, stores began placing limits on purchases of sanitation products,
and later began placing limits on food items as well.199 Later in the year,
as cases of COVID-19 began to rise again in November, some stores returned to this policy to discourage hoarding behavior of essential goods.200
Walmart even placed quantity limits on online purchases of eggs.201
There were no state or federal quantity limits on food items, however, government intervention commonly places quantity limits on certain
items, like prescription drugs.202 Additionally, the federal government has
created quantity limits on food purchases in times of crisis, notably
during World War II.203 What if federal and state governments had acted
to place quantity limits on consumer goods instead of private retailers?
From an efficiency standpoint, quantity limits typically lead to a
general loss of welfare.204 When a consumer has the demand for two
cartons of eggs, but can only purchase one by an external constraint, that
11, 15 (1944) (describing food rationing in the United States during World War II);
Adrian R. Fleissig & Gerald Whitney, A Revealed Preference Test of Rationing, 113 ECON.
LETTERS 234, 235 (2010) (describing the rationing system in the United Kingdom during
World War II).
198
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consumer is worse off.205 The constraining of demand also creates opportunities for black markets to meet consumers’ actual demand.206 Binding
rationing thus leads to inefficient outcomes.
Binding rationing has the goal of ensuring that there is enough
supply for all consumers, in theory leading to equitable distribution.207
However, quantity limits alone are not targeted to low-income individuals, and result in the same distribution issues as price controls, primarily
distributing goods on a first come first served basis.208 Black markets also
interfere with equitable distribution goals; if sophisticated consumers
can access the black market, no overall supply is saved.209 Quantity
limits, then, are not generally efficient or equitable.
D.

Food Subsidies and Non-Binding Rationing

Instead of placing maximum limits on consumer choice, governments may instead attempt to meet distributional goals by providing
minimum supplies to targeted consumer groups. This may take the form
of food subsidies, where governments purchase food commodities themselves and provide them to consumers at a lower cost.210 This may be
done with or without quantity limits;211 here the focus is on the subsidies
themselves. Consumers would be free to buy as many eggs as they desire
on the free market, but the government distributional program acts as
a subsidized market, primarily for the benefit of low-income consumers
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when free market prices rise.212 For example, while the free market price
of eggs continues to rise, low-income consumers would still be able to
purchase them at a lower, perhaps precrisis cost.213 This may also be
termed “non-binding” rationing.214
The government operates such a program at an obvious economic
loss.215 However, the United States already operates a kind of decentralized
food distribution program in The Emergency Food Assistance Program
(“TEFAP”).216 In this program, the USDA purchases food commodities on
the free market and distributes them to state agencies, which in turn distribute the commodities to food banks.217 States have their own eligibility
requirements for TEFAP, but can create additional flexibilities to apply the
program more broadly, though they do so at their discretion.218 Both of the
early coronavirus relief packages provided additional funding for TEFAP.219
The most recent relief bill also allocated additional funding to the USDA
for the purchase and distribution of food to “individuals in need.”220
TEFAP is not a rationing program, but it is not difficult to imagine it as a part of a more robust non-binding rationing scheme.221 A more
formalized organizational structure, as opposed to the current decentralized
structure with varying requirements, may be beneficial for low-income
communities, particularly in times of crisis when food prices increase.222
A systematic review of food bank literature in 2016 found that food banks
tend to provide inadequate amounts of food.223 Limited government
funding in previous years has also created strain on the food banking
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system, which is further strained by food price increases.224 If the federal
government took a more active role in the food distribution system by
providing commodities like eggs, this might help meet the needs of lowincome communities that are reliant on food banks, both in emergencies
and regular market conditions.225
This kind of non-binding rationing scheme splits the commodity
market in two: an open market, responsive to price, and the government
subsidized market.226 This has the potential to lead to inefficient outcomes,
particularly in the long term, as governmental bureaucracy is not wellequipped to respond to consumer preferences.227 However, the bifurcated
market ensures that higher income individuals have access to the free
market to exert their choice, while lower income individuals have continued access to subsidized essentials.228 Of the four policy alternatives
described, this scheme is the most directly targeted to low-income communities, and could help governments meet equitable goals, particularly
during crisis price increases of the sort observed during the pandemic.229
CONCLUSION
In February of 2021, a catastrophic and atypical snowstorm hit
Texas. It did not take long to set up hotlines to report price gouging, and
soon the State was receiving reports of exorbitant prices on food and housing.231 By March, the Texas Attorney General filed at least one price
gouging lawsuit against a San Antonio hotel.232 In a year that has seen a
major environmental crisis in its first two months, and where worldwide
230
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hunger and food insecurity are predicted to get worse,233 questions of
accessibility to essential goods will continue to be paramount.
Lessons learned from the 2020 egg market may help governments
answer these questions. The United States egg market experienced a
large crisis price increase in 2020.234 Federal and state governments took
steps to address this price increase, but the results of the action were
either not successful, inconclusive, or questionable in the first place.235
Allowing prices to increase unfettered may give rise to equity and
distributional concerns,236 but price controls themselves have shortcomings in both efficiency and equity.237 Policies not to litigate price gouging
claims, supply-side changes, quantity limits, and food subsidies all have
benefits and drawbacks, but these may balance the dual, sometimes competing, goals of efficiency and equity better than price gouging litigation.238
Looking forward to future crises, balancing efficiency and equity will be
important to ensure that the policies used to combat crisis price increases
are effective at achieving their goals and managing essential supplies
during environmental crises.239
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